中共文宣攻勢
中共中央宣傳部監管中國所有媒體，從權力結構、人數規模、行政預算來看，它是中共最大的部級黨政機關，也是軍隊以外，中共最重要的維穩系統。它能將中共的任何施政全部包裝為德政，能將民主國家的任何事蹟描繪成劣蹟、暴政，對民主國家人民進行文宣攻勢，再轉內銷，洗腦自己的人民，形成內外一體的與論攻勢。
本文分兩部分：（1）中共網軍培訓課程、（2）中共如何編造、竄改海外時論文章。
（1）中共網軍培訓課程
中共中央網絡安全和信息化委員會辦公室（簡稱網信辦）是執行中共中央宣傳部所訂宣傳政策的機關，它的媒體操作技術、與論控制方法......爐火純青、收放自如。以新冠疫情爆發的媒體管控為例，紐約時報、揭秘中共、中國數位時代等傳媒網站曾揭露網信辦如何操縱網路輿論，壓制負面新聞，例如李文亮醫生死訊（負面新聞）出現，網信辦如何操縱網路輿論，重新掌握話語權，引導民眾總體保持溫和，讓民眾始終相信改良，最後讓民眾始終相信國家、相信政府、相信黨。（網信辦文件揭露當局如何操縱疫情輿論）
中共中央宣傳部指示培養的網軍（俗稱五毛）有一套規範做法，有心人將它整理為維穩培訓課程，正在網路流傳，它有14項要點，揭錄如下：
(建議閱讀這些培訓準則時，同時回想中共操作李文亮醫生死訊的與論形勢過程，會讓您有更真切的感覺)
1，維護大局穩定，預防群眾反抗，利用民眾貪生怕死的心理，進行思想維穩。主力宣傳民主改良，培養民眾成為溫和派！讓民眾始終相信國家、相信政府、相信黨。
2、要學會轉移矛盾，遇到關注腐敗的，就把責任推給貪官污吏，遇到關注民生的，比如醫療就推給醫院，養老就推給社會推給老百姓，房價就推給開發商，環境污染就推給企業和有關單位失職，暴力執法就推給員警和城管！要讓民眾相信黨的政策是好的，只是某些官員沒把中央的政策執行好！避免將問題引向社會主義制度以及黨和政府。
3、對於影響社會穩定的熱點問題，要懂得轉移視線，假扮成民主派與民眾和異見人士討論，用一些八卦娛樂或者不會觸及制度、不會影響穩定的熱點話題進行炒作，分散民眾注意力！
4、利用個體之間的認知差異，適時拋出一些具有一定說服力的意見，引導民眾展開討論，引導民間形成不同派系，相互之間不斷爭論，從而產生矛盾！適當的時候可以三五人一組，各支持一方，讓異見人士在無休止的爭論中消磨時間和精力，要對他們進行分化瓦解，防止維權群體之間達成共識和團結！
5、對於各種問題的探討，一定要避免觸及社會主義制度本身，讓民眾的認知始終停留在體制和法律的改良上面，讓民眾始終相信改良，推崇改良。
6、宣傳全民覺醒理論：避免維權群體走向極端，讓一部分頑固份子抱有一絲希望，有一個精神寄託！其重點還是引導民眾總體保持溫和，避免出現暴力抗爭，影響社會穩定。
7、學會釣魚維穩，對一些暴力傾向較重，又無法進行思想改變的個體，要積極與其接近甚至假裝參與，全方位瞭解對方的思想動向，在全盤掌握其計畫後，適時誘導對方採取實際行動，並及時報告有關部門進行抓捕，做到人贓俱獲。
8、偶爾拋出一些假消息，誘導維權群體轉發，在形成一定影響力後，適時揭穿假消息，借此打擊削弱維權群體的公信力。
9、一人多號，利用不同身份發佈一些虛假內幕腐敗消息，引導民眾關注官員個人腐敗，將腐敗炒作成娛樂八卦，讓民眾對腐敗產生麻木，消除腐敗的敏感性，同時也淡化維權群體的民主訴求。
10、利用各方面的質疑，揭露對方過去的污點，來打擊維權群體中影響力較大者，防止出現具有凝聚力的領導人物。
11、讓維權群體與普通民眾產生隔閡，在兩者之間製造矛盾，利用一些維權群體比較自負的特點，引導他們歧視普通民眾，以此削弱其影響力。
12、以捧殺的方式，讓頑固份子與西方民主理論脫離現實，用國民素質論、國情論、歷史論、文化論.....等一切可以利用的理論，對民主制度進行否定，同時列舉一些民主制度的失敗例子，引導民眾繼續相信社會主義道路。
13、團結改良派，打擊頑固派和革命派，強化社會主義思想的群眾基礎，削弱民主思想對民眾的影響力。
14、堅持網路輿論維穩與社會武力維穩並重，搞好網路與官方媒體輿論引導工作，打擊敵對勢力，分化瓦解維權群體，消除民眾對政府和黨的敵視，防止出現暴力抗爭，維護社會穩定！ 保證社會主義人民民主專制制度五百年不動搖！
上述中共網軍培訓課程所製造的言論，同時也滲透到台灣許多媒體，包括報紙、電視、油管（YouTube）網站、Line群組、.........，期待大家多注意，以免自己被中共洗腦了，還不自知。
（2）中共如何編造、竄改海外時論文章
新冠肺炎災情全球大流行，一發不可收拾，它不僅帶來全球公共健康的危機，更在重塑世界秩序。3月18日美國《外交事務》（Foreign Affairs）雜誌發表「新冠肺炎可能重塑世界秩序：中共正利用美國跌跌撞撞之際搶奪世界領導地位」一文，文章指出中共正努力輸出其防疫成功經驗，協助各國抗疫，藉此發揮國際影響力。文章提醒美國：疫情結束後，中共將會取代美國，成為重塑世界秩序的主要領導力量。
《外交事務》雜誌是很具影響力的國際關係政策權威媒體，它刊載的每篇文章都具有引導世界局勢風向的影響力。在疫情爆發時刻，作者Campbell 與 Doshi撰寫「新冠肺炎可能重塑世界秩序」文章，指出中共正在乘隙而入，影響未來全球秩序的重塑。原文標題是：The Coronavirus Could Reshape Global Order：China Is Maneuvering for International Leadership as the United States Falters，中文翻譯：新冠肺炎可能重塑世界秩序：中共正利用美國跌跌撞撞之際搶奪世界領導地位。
這樣的文章必然引起中共的重視，中共官媒也會引述，然後向國人展示：美國學者認為美國沒落了、 U. S. Falters，世界正由中共在操盤。
長期觀看大陸的主流媒體，你會發覺，大陸媒體的新聞報導非常國際化，媒體常常引用外國媒體的新聞或報導，製造萬邦來朝的新聞風向，展現「厲害了，我的國」的大國風範。但很少人發覺，這些外國新聞都是被過濾、挑選，選出對中共有利的文宣。若有對中共不利的文章，但文章很重要，中共會加以竄改、編造，如果很難竄改、編造，就封鎖或刪除，再貼上謊言標籤。
由於中共禁止外國媒體在國內流傳，中共文宣再怎麼編造、竄改，沒有人追查，追查不易，原作者或外國媒體也不會來抗議，即使有人追查原文，（英文）看不懂、閱讀有困難，很少人有這種閒工夫。這種沒人會去追查原文原意的障礙，正是中共最喜歡使用的文宣，可以隨便中共張冠李戴、移木接花，製造外國人都痛恨民主國家腐敗政權的假象，愚弄自己的人民。
在國際宣傳方面，自由世界根本不是中共文宣的對手，理由很簡單，獨裁國家政府掌控所有傳媒，可以自吹自擂（甚至自欺欺人），民主國家政府不能壓制輿論，必須接受媒體監督。
這一體制差異在宣傳上形成天差地別的不對等。假設民主與獨裁的政府都在做事，但從宣傳角度來看，後果完全不同：
*民主國家政府做的任何事，都可以任你罵，罵到讓人感覺，政府專幹壞事、民主很爛！
*獨裁國家政府如果做壞事，它可以講成好事，媒體不斷歌頌它（幹壞事），讓你覺得政府都做好事、獨裁很棒！
在對付民主國家開放的媒體，中共的文宣具有壓倒性優勢，除了掌控所有媒體外，它很會自吹自擂，也很會汙衊、醜化（對方）。在國際傳播媒體爆炸的今天，中共在國內進行新聞封鎖，自由世界都坦開大門、資訊透明，資訊全部攤給中共，讓它任意引用、過濾、報喜不報優、移木接花：
** 對中共的中立評論轉成偏坦（中共），
** 對中共的不利評論一律封殺，
** 對中共的有利評論加以跨大。
以下我以Campbell 與 Doshi的新冠肺炎可能重塑世界秩序一文為例，說明中共對西方權威文章的處理宣傳。這篇文章被中國傳媒大學教授趙瑞琦摘譯為中文，並將原文題目改為：美國外交認知共同體：新冠肺炎重塑世界秩序，美國面臨蘇伊士時刻。我從今日頭條截錄這篇文章，為了說明趙教授的文章如何偏離Campbell 與 Doshi文章原意，我將原文全部轉貼，附在本文最後，但為了讓大家讀懂原文，我重點翻譯前面四段如下：（）內文字是我自己添加的。
（原文第一段）由於新冠肺炎的大流行，導致世界區域的隔離，這一種地域隔離的意義目前被放在健康與安全之後，但未來會證明，它是美國全球地位（弱化）的結果。全球秩序最初的改變都很緩慢，然後一次突然併發（以1956年的蘇伊士運河為例，說明該事件導致大英帝國從此衰敗）。如果美國政府無法應付新冠肺炎（導致地域隔離）的關鍵時刻，它極可能是美國的蘇伊士運河事件。
（原文第二段）政界都知道川普政府對（新冠肺炎疫情）的最初反應簡直爛透了（文章列舉事證），（本句結論）川普政府根本沒有準備來領導全球對疫情的回應。
（原文第三段）美國過去所建立的全球領導地位不是依靠財富與強權，而是依靠：（1）源於美國國內治理的合法性、（2）提供全球公共財的援助、（3）協調各國來應付危機的能力與意願。新冠肺炎疫情正在測試上述三項美國領導地位的要素，目前為止，沒有一項合格。
（原文第四段）當川普政府跌跌撞撞之際，北京政府把握美國失誤的機會，迅速動員與調整，在世界防疫領導真空中補上一腳，它大力吹噓自己的防疫系統，對受災國提供物資援助，甚至去協助它國政府抗災。中國的大膽行動很難被理解，它早期隱匿災情的嚴重性與散播的錯誤，助長疫情向世界擴散的危機，但北京很清楚，如果它能（在全球防疫）領先一步，美國無能於此，這一印象將改變美國在全球政治的地位，以及21世紀全球領導地位的競爭。
如果讀懂Campbell 與 Doshi文章前面四段內容，大概就知道作者全部論述內容了。
趙文文章很短，能很快瀏覽，我也將文章附在Campbell 與 Doshi文章之前，該文將原文內容歸納為A-F六大項、17條重點，六大項分別是：
A. 健康高於一切
B. 對美國領導地位衰落的擔憂
C. 對另一大國的指責和負面觀點
D. 對特朗普政府低效抗議的指責
E. 疫情之下中美在全球供應鏈中的競爭
F. 國際合作與應對：中美對比
上述六大項與Campbell 與 Doshi文章差很大。直接說，Campbell 與 Doshi文章重點在：中共以防疫為名在爭奪全球領導地位的野心，趙文全部略去不談，把文章重點放在美國面臨蘇伊士時刻（如標題），趙文的C大項「對另一大國的指責和負面觀點」把中共用「另一大國」遮掩起來，文章摘錄5、6重點內容也都略去。
趙文的 A大項「健康高於一切」，是他自已添加的，Campbell 與 Doshi文章根本沒有這一論述。
趙文的 B大項「對美國領導地位衰落的擔憂」有234三個重點：（2）苏伊士时刻、（3）美国的合法性、（4）强调合法性。其中（2）苏伊士时刻是抄自Campbell 與 Doshi文章開頭第一段，藉大英帝國地位衰落來隱喻美國的考驗時刻。（3）美国的合法性與（4）强调合法性，抄自Campbell 與 Doshi文章開頭第三段（再轉貼於下），Campbell 與 Doshi提及合法性是指美国總統與其行政團隊是否適職稱任，不涉及全球/公共产品供应、协调全球危机应对的能力，但趙教授將原文曲解為美國在国内治理、全球/公共产品供应、协调全球危机应对，都有合法性問題（太扯了）。
美國過去所建立的全球領導地位不是依靠財富與強權，而是依靠：（1）源於美國國內治理的合法性、（2）提供全球公共財的援助、（3）協調各國來應付危機的能力與意願。新冠肺炎疫情正在測試上述三項美國領導地位的要素，目前為止，沒有一項合格。
共產黨執政最怕別人挑戰它的legitimacy（合法性），因為它是獨裁而長期執政的政體。但它最希望民主國家政府都有legitimacy問題，Campbell 與 Doshi文章第三段只出現一個legitimacy字，趙教授曲解為美國政府的全球領導地位有合法性問題。天才!!!
兩篇文章內容的比對就陳述到此。我們知道，大陸媒體在轉載這類外國媒體文章都是有目的的，使用趙文這篇文章目的在藉美打美、藉美捧共，使用的手法就是：張冠李戴、移木接花，大力宣傳美國政府很爛、中國很棒，將這樣的思想轉內銷，欺瞞自己的百姓。
下圖，今日頭條引用美國傳染病專家Fauci（站在川普旁邊，圈紅框，相當於中共的鍾南山），間接宣傳對川普講中國病毒是錯誤的。
美國外交認知共同體：新冠肺炎重塑世界秩序，美國面臨蘇伊士時刻
中國傳媒大學教授趙瑞琦
https://www.toutiao.com/a1661855757800462/
3月18日，美国《外交事务》（Foreign Affairs）杂志网站发表了一篇题为《新冠肺炎可能重塑世界秩序》的文章，其作者为Kurt M. Capmbell和Rush Doshi，两人都是美国对外政策共同体内的民主党精英。
【A. 健康高于一切】
1、健康首位（HEALTH FIRST)：应将病毒的地缘政治影响视为健康与安全问题的次要因素，但它并未被华盛顿忽视，这对美国的地位具有影响。
【B. 对美国领导地位衰落的担忧】
2、苏伊士时刻（SUEZ MOMENT）：1956年，对苏伊士的拙劣干预揭露了英国政权的衰落，标志着其成为全球大国时代的终结。今天，如果美国不迎头赶上直面现状，则冠状病毒大流行可能标志着另一个“苏伊士时刻”。
3、美国的合法性（US LEGITIMACY）：美国的领导地位不仅基于财富/权力，而且还基于来自美国的“合法性”：
a）国内治理，
b）全球/公共产品供应，
c）协调全球危机应对的能力。
4、强调合法性（STRESSED LEGITIMACY）：冠状病毒大流行正在考验美国领导力的上述所有三个要素。到目前为止，华盛顿未能通过测试。
【C. 对另一大国的指责和负面观点】
5、略。
6、略。
【D. 对特朗普政府低效抗议的指责】
7、美国国内治理（US DOMESTIC GOVERNANCE）：美国的人均测验比任何发达国家都要少。（特朗普政府）由于政治原因推迟了响应，并拆散了应对大规模流行病的机制设置。“毫无讽刺意味的”国外媒体现在正谴责美国的“不负责和无能”。
补充：此处所提及的被解散机制应该指的是，奥巴马任期内在白宫国家安全委员会内设置的一个应对大规模流行病威胁的团队。特朗普于2018年将其解散。
【E. 疫情之下中美在全球供应链中的竞争】
8、物资生产（GOODS PRODUCTION）：中国制造了应对危机所必需的口罩、呼吸器和呼吸机。美国只具有所需口罩/呼吸器总产量的1%和呼吸机的10%。美国缺乏满足自身需求的工业能力，更不用说在危机恶化之际提供援助了。
9、物资供应（GOODS PROVISION）：中国正在向欧洲、54个非洲州国家、伊朗和美国提供援助。美国早些时候也对外提供了援助，但鉴于目前国内危机的加剧，现在不具备对外援助的能力。
【F. 国际合作与应对：中美对比】
10、协调（COORDINATION）：5年之前，美国领导70个国家进行埃博拉应对行动。今天，在有关协调危机应对、物资流动、财政刺激、信息共享等方面，美国虽然缺席但未离开（Absent WithOut Leave) 。
11、做什么（WHAT TO DO）：替代国家追求全球领导地位的主要资产在于，人们认为美国政策的不足和内化。华盛顿需要做符合人们对世界领导期待的事情，即在国内解决问题，提供全球公共产品，并协调全球对策。
12、如何领导（HOW TO LEAD）：美国需要在国内处理这场危机（出于自身考虑，搁置政治）。它需要通过战时工业动员来进行口罩，呼吸机和呼吸器的生产，以挽救谎言并减少全球资源不足的局面。这需要协调全球响应。
13、疫苗（VACCINES）：美国在疫苗生产方面具有比较优势。考虑到成本，有些公司并未加入疫苗研发。因此美国需要提供大量财政补贴，以支持疫苗研究、临床试验以及最终的批量生产。
14、略。在目前的形势下这使美国看起来十分渺小，由于我们被期待发挥领导作用，这对美国产生了不对称的伤害。
15、获得消息（GETTING THE MESSAGE）：大多数国家都不想看到美国将国际关系置于冠状病毒叙述的中心。他们希望得到一条严肃对待危机及其解决方案的信息。而且，我们可以兜售（和研究）在开放社会中的成功应对措施。
16、与中国合作（WORKING WITH CHINA）：如果美国无法与中国在疫苗、临床试验、财政刺激、信息共享、物资、援助等方面进行协调，其代价是巨大的。
17、底线（BOTTOM LINE）：在涉及如此众多领域的竞争中，美国可以“通过做好事而做得好”（the United States can do well by doing good）。
"总的来说Kurt和Rush写了一篇很优秀的文章。尽管其中并未充分强调这一点，即中国对美国的可笑的指责在很大程度上是由美国政客的愚蠢言论所引发的。但很高兴能看到Kurt强调了美国应该与中国合作。”
The Coronavirus Could Reshape Global Order
China Is Maneuvering for International Leadership as the United States Falters
By Kurt M. Campbell and Rush Doshi March 18, 2020
原文連結：https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-03-18/coronavirus-could-reshape-global-order
With hundreds of millions of people now isolating themselves around the world, the novel coronavirus pandemic has become a truly global event. And while its geopolitical implications should be considered secondary to matters of health and safety, those implications may, in the long term, prove just as consequential—especially when it comes to the United States’ global position. Global orders have a tendency to change gradually at first and then all at once. In 1956, a botched intervention in the Suez laid bare the decay in British power and marked the end of the United Kingdom’s reign as a global power. Today, U.S. policymakers should recognize that if the United States does not rise to meet the moment, the coronavirus pandemic could mark another “Suez moment.”
由於的大流行，導致世界區域的隔離，這一種地域隔離的意義被放在健康與安全之後，但未來會證明，它是美國全球地位所造成的。全球秩序最初的改變都很緩慢，然後一次突然併發。（以1956年的蘇伊士運河為例，說明該事件導致大英帝國從此衰敗）如果美國政府好好應付新冠肺炎（帶來的隔離），它極可能是美國的蘇伊士運河事件。
It is now clear to all but the most blinkered partisans that Washington has botched its initial response. Missteps by key institutions, from the White House and the Department of Homeland Security to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), have undermined confidence in the capacity and competence of U.S. governance. Public statements by President Donald Trump, whether Oval Office addresses or early-morning tweets, have largely served to sow confusion and spread uncertainty. Both public and private sectors have proved ill-prepared to produce and distribute the tools necessary for testing and response. And internationally, the pandemic has amplified Trump’s instincts to go it alone and exposed just how unprepared Washington is to lead a global response.
政界都知道川普政府對（新冠肺炎疫情）的最初反應簡直爛透了（文章列舉事證），（本句結論）川普政府根本沒有準備來領導全球對疫情的回應。
The status of the United States as a global leader over the past seven decades has been built not just on wealth and power but also, and just as important, on the legitimacy that flows from the United States’ domestic governance, provision of global public goods, and ability and willingness to muster and coordinate a global response to crises. The coronavirus pandemic is testing all three elements of U.S. leadership. So far, Washington is failing the test.
美國從過去所建立的全球領導地位不是依靠財富與強權，而是依靠：（1）源於美國國內治理的合法性、（2）提供全球公共財的援助、（3）協調各國來應付危機的能力與意願。新冠肺炎疫情正在測試上述三項美國領導地位的要素，目前為止，沒有一項合格。
As Washington falters, Beijing is moving quickly and adeptly to take advantage of the opening created by U.S. mistakes, filling the vacuum to position itself as the global leader in pandemic response. It is working to tout its own system, provide material assistance to other countries, and even organize other governments. The sheer chutzpah of China’s move is hard to overstate. After all, it was Beijing’s own missteps—especially its efforts at first to cover up the severity and spread of the outbreak—that helped create the very crisis now afflicting much of the world. Yet Beijing understands that if it is seen as leading, and Washington is seen as unable or unwilling to do so, this perception could fundamentally alter the United States’ position in global politics and the contest for leadership in the twenty-first century.
當川普政府跌跌撞撞之際，北京政府把握美國失誤的機會，迅速動員與調整，在世界防疫領導真空中補上一腳，它大力吹噓自己的防疫系統，對受災國提供物資援助，甚至去協助它國政府抗災。中國的大膽行動很難被理解，它早期隱匿災情的嚴重性與散播的錯誤，助長疫情向世界擴散的危機，但北京很清楚，如果它能（在全球防疫）領先一步，美國無能於此，這一印象將改變美國在全球政治的地位，以及21世紀全球領導地位的競爭。
MISTAKES WERE MADE
In the immediate aftermath of the outbreak of the novel coronavirus, which causes the disease now referred to as COVID-19, the missteps of Chinese leaders cast a pall on their country’s global standing. The virus was first detected in November 2019 in the city of Wuhan, but officials didn’t disclose it for months and even punished the doctors who first reported it, squandering precious time and delaying by at least five weeks measures that would educate the public, halt travel, and enable widespread testing. Even as the full scale of the crisis emerged, Beijing tightly controlled information, shunned assistance from the CDC, limited World Health Organization travel to Wuhan, likely undercounted infections and deaths, and repeatedly altered the criteria for registering new COVID-19 cases—perhaps in a deliberate effort to manipulate the official number of cases.
As the crisis worsened through January and February, some observers speculated that the coronavirus might even undermine the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. It was called China’s “Chernobyl”; Dr. Li Wenliang—the young whistleblower silenced by the government who later succumbed to complications from the COVID-19—was likened to the Tiananmen Square “tank man.”
Yet by early March, China was claiming victory. Mass quarantines, a halt to travel, and a complete shutdown of most daily life nationwide were credited with having stemmed the tide; official statistics, such as they are, reported that daily new cases had fallen into the single digits in mid-March from the hundreds in early February. In a surprise to most observers, Chinese leader Xi Jinping—who had been uncharacteristically quiet in the first weeks—began to put himself squarely at the center of the response. This month, he personally visited Wuhan.
Even though life in China has yet to return to normal (and despite continuing questions over the accuracy of China’s statistics), Beijing is working to turn these early signs of success into a larger narrative to broadcast to the rest of the world—one that makes China the essential player in a coming global recovery while airbrushing away its earlier mismanagement of the crisis.
A critical part of this narrative is Beijing’s supposed success in battling the virus. A steady stream of propaganda articles, tweets, and public messaging, in a wide variety of languages, touts China’s achievements and highlights the effectiveness of its model of domestic governance. “China’s signature strength, efficiency and speed in this fight has been widely acclaimed,” declared Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian. China, he added, set “a new standard for the global efforts against the epidemic.” Central authorities have instituted tight informational control and discipline at state organs to snuff out contradictory narratives.
These messages are helped by the implicit contrast with efforts to battle the virus in the West, particularly in the United States—Washington’s failure to produce adequate numbers of testing kits, which means the United States has tested relatively few people per capita, or the Trump administration’s ongoing disassembly of the U.S. government’s pandemic-response infrastructure. Beijing has seized the narrative opportunity provided by American disarray, its state media and diplomats regularly reminding a global audience of the superiority of Chinese efforts and criticizing the “irresponsibility and incompetence” of the “so-called political elite in Washington,” as the state-run Xinhua news agency put it in an editorial.
Chinese officials and state media have even insisted that the coronavirus did not in fact emerge from China—despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary—in order to reduce China’s blame for the global pandemic. This effort has elements of a full-blown Russian-style disinformation campaign, with China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman and over a dozen diplomats sharing poorly sourced articles accusing the U.S. military of spreading the coronavirus in Wuhan. These actions, combined with China’s unprecedented mass expulsion of journalists from three leading American papers, damage China’s pretensions to leadership.
CHINA MAKES, THE WORLD TAKES
Xi understands that providing global goods can burnish a rising power’s leadership credentials. He has spent the last several years pushing China’s foreign policy apparatus to think harder about leading reforms to “global governance,” and the coronavirus offers an opportunity to put that theory into action. Consider China’s increasingly well-publicized displays of material assistance—including masks, respirators, ventilators, and medicine. At the outset of the crisis, China purchased and produced (and received as aid) vast quantities of these goods. Now it is in a position to hand them out to others.
When no European state answered Italy’s urgent appeal for medical equipment and protective gear, China publicly committed to sending 1,000 ventilators, two million masks, 100,000 respirators, 20,000 protective suits, and 50,000 test kits. China has also dispatched medical teams and 250,000 masks to Iran and sent supplies to Serbia, whose president dismissed European solidarity as “a fairy tale” and proclaimed that “the only country that can help us is China.” Alibaba co-founder Jack Ma has promised to send large quantities of testing kits and masks to the United States, as well as 20,000 test kits and 100,000 masks to each of Africa’s 54 countries.
Beijing’s edge in material assistance is enhanced by the simple fact that much of what the world depends on to fight the coronavirus is made in China. It was already the major producer of surgical masks; now, through wartime-like industrial mobilization, it has boosted production of masks more than tenfold, giving it the capacity to provide them to the world. China also produces roughly half of the N95 respirators critical for protecting health workers (it has forced foreign factories in China to make them and then sell them directly to the government), giving it another foreign policy tool in the form of medical equipment. Meanwhile, antibiotics are critical for addressing emerging secondary infections from COVID-19, and China produces the vast majority of active pharmaceutical ingredients necessary to make them.
The United States, by contrast, lacks the supply and capacity to meet many of its own demands, let alone to provide aid in crisis zones elsewhere. The picture is grim. The U.S. Strategic National Stockpile, the nation’s reserve of critical medical supplies, is believed to have only one percent of the masks and respirators and perhaps ten percent of the ventilators needed to deal with the pandemic. The rest will have to be made up with imports from China or rapidly increased domestic manufacturing. Similarly, China’s share of the U.S. antibiotics market is more than 95 percent, and most of the ingredients cannot be manufactured domestically. Although Washington offered assistance to China and others at the outset of the crisis, it is less able to do so now, as its own needs grow; Beijing, in contrast, is offering aid precisely when the global need is greatest.
Crisis response, however, is not only about material goods. During the 2014–15 Ebola crisis, the United States assembled and led a coalition of dozens of countries to counter the spread of the disease. The Trump administration has so far shunned a similar leadership effort to respond to the coronavirus. Even coordination with allies has been lacking. Washington appears, for example, not to have given its European allies any prior notice before instituting a ban on travel from Europe.
China, by contrast, has undertaken a robust diplomatic campaign to convene dozens of countries and hundreds of officials, generally by videoconference, to share information about the pandemic and lessons from China’s own experience battling the disease. Like much of China’s diplomacy, these convening efforts are largely conducted at the regional level or through regional bodies. They include calls with central and eastern European states through the “17 + 1” mechanism, with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s secretariat, with ten Pacific Island states, and with other groupings across Africa, Europe, and Asia. And China is working hard to publicize such initiatives. Virtually every story on the front page of its foreign-facing propaganda organs advertises China’s efforts to help different countries with goods and information while underscoring the superiority of Beijing’s approach.
HOW TO LEAD
China’s chief asset in its pursuit of global leadership—in the face of the coronavirus and more broadly—is the perceived inadequacy and inward focus of U.S. policy. The ultimate success of China’s pursuit, therefore, will depend as much on what happens in Washington as on what happens in Beijing. In the current crisis, Washington can still turn the tide if it proves capable of doing what is expected of a leader: managing the problem at home, supplying global public goods, and coordinating a global response.
The first of those tasks—stopping the spread of the disease and protecting vulnerable populations in the United States—is most urgent and largely a question of domestic governance rather than geopolitics. But how Washington goes about it will have geopolitical implications, and not just insofar as it does or does not reestablish confidence in the U.S. response. For example, if the federal government immediately supports and subsidizes expansion of domestic production of masks, respirators, and ventilators—a response befitting the wartime urgency of this pandemic—it would both save American lives and help others around the world by reducing the scarcity of global supplies.
While the United States isn’t currently able to meet the urgent material demands of the pandemic, its continuing global edge in the life sciences and biotechnology can be instrumental in finding a real solution to the crisis: a vaccine. The U.S. government can help by providing incentives to U.S. labs and companies to undertake a medical “Manhattan Project” to devise, rapidly test in clinical trials, and mass-produce a vaccine. Because these efforts are costly and require dauntingly high upfront investments, generous government financing and bonuses for successful vaccine production could make a difference. And it is worth noting that despite Washington’s mismanagement, state and local governments, nonprofit and religious organizations, universities, and companies are not waiting for the federal government to get its act together before taking action. U.S.-funded companies and researchers are already making progress toward a vaccine—though even in the best-case scenario, it will be some time before one is ready for widespread use.
Yet even as it focuses on efforts at home, Washington cannot simply ignore the need for a coordinated global response. Only strong leadership can solve global coordination problems related to travel restrictions, information sharing, and the flow of critical goods. The United States has successfully provided such leadership for decades, and it must do so again.
That leadership will also require effectively cooperating with China, rather than getting consumed by a war of narratives about who responded better. Little is gained by repeatedly emphasizing the origins of the coronavirus—which are already widely known despite China’s propaganda—or engaging in petty tit-for-tat rhetorical exchanges with Beijing. As Chinese officials accuse the U.S. military of spreading the virus and lambaste U.S. efforts, Washington should respond when necessary but generally resist the temptation to put China at the center of its coronavirus messaging. Most countries coping with the challenge would rather see a public message that stresses the seriousness of a shared global challenge and possible paths forward (including successful examples of coronavirus response in democratic societies such as Taiwan and South Korea). And there is much Washington and Beijing could do together for the world’s benefit: coordinating vaccine research and clinical trials as well as fiscal stimulus; sharing information; cooperating on industrial mobilization (on machines for producing critical respirator components or ventilator parts, for instance); and offering joint assistance to others.
Ultimately, the coronavirus might even serve as a wake-up call, spurring progress on other global challenges requiring U.S.-Chinese cooperation, such as climate change. Such a step should not be seen—and would not be seen by the rest of the world—as a concession to Chinese power. Rather, it would go some way toward restoring faith in the future of U.S. leadership. In the current crisis, as in geopolitics today more generally, the United States can do well by doing good.
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